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Handelskrieg und seine Folgen: Ist die WTO am Ende?

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Braml
  • Gabriel Felbermayr
  • Wolfgang Weiß
  • Fritz Breuss
  • Christoph Scherrer
  • Christoph Herrmann
  • Caroline Glöckle
  • Benjamin Jung
  • Tim Krieger
  • Laura Renner
  • Bernd Lange

Abstract

Die angekündigten und zum Teil eingeleiteten Maßnahmen der USA zum Schutz ihrer Wirtschaft, nicht zuletzt die Einführung von Zusatzzöllen, haben fatale Folgen für das globale Handelssystem. Die USA sind auf dem Weg, die bisherigen Regeln der Weltwirtschaft außer Kraft zu setzen und einen Handelskrieg zu beginnen. Zudem entziehen die USA faktisch der Welthandelsorganisation WTO die Unterstützung. Steht die WTO vor ihrem Ende? Martin Braml und Gabriel Felbermayr, ifo Institut, gehen davon aus, dass die US-Regierung kein Interesse am Kollaps der WTO hat. Vermutlich wolle sie durch Drohgebärden Raum für Verhandlungen schaffen. Um die verfahrene Situation für die WTO aufzulösen, bedürfe es globaler Nulllösungen, die keine Ausnahmen mehr zulassen. Wenn diese Nulllösungen sowohl Zölle, Marktzugangsbeschränkungen, Antidumping-Maßnahmen und den Schutz geistigen Eigentums betreffen, sei dies für alle Seiten gleichermaßen schmerzhaft wie segensreich. Wolfgang Weiß, Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer, sieht in dem US-Unilateralismus die Zerstörung der Grundlagen internationaler Regeln. Insgesamt belegten die Aktionen der USA eine Haltung, die an den Grundfesten der WTO als einem multilateralen Regelwerk rüttelt. Fritz Breuss, WU Wien, erläutert die derzeitige Strategie der USA mit drei »Spielzügen«: Druck, Kooperation und/oder Handelskrieg. Vor allem die EU, aber auch China, sollten dem Druck der USA nicht nachgeben. Nach Ansicht von Christoph Scherrer, Universität Kassel, sollte man nicht das Ende der WTO vermuten. Angesichts der Interessenlage der US-Industrie und ihren politischen Einflussmöglichkeiten sei nicht mit einem ausufernden Handelskrieg zu rechnen, sondern mit einer weiteren Stärkung wirtschaftlicher gegenüber politischen Körperschaften. Christoph Herrmann und Caroline Glöckle, Universität Passau, zeigen, dass das derzeitige Vorgehen der USA wie auch die unterschiedlichen Reaktionen ihrer Handelspartner komplexe und überwiegend ungeklärte welthandelsrechtliche Fragestellungen aufwerfen. Benjamin Jung, Universität Hohenheim, legt dar, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Handelskrieg gewonnen werden kann und welche Schlussfolgerung sich daraus für die europäische Position ergibt. Seinen Berechnungen zufolge können die USA einen Handelskrieg nur gewinnen, wenn der Rest der Welt unterschiedliche Strategien verfolgt und nicht als einheitlicher Block auftritt. Für Tim Krieger und Laura Renner, Universität Freiburg, verkennt die Trump-Administration, dass Schutzzölle in negativer Weise zumeist auf das Land zurückfallen, das sie zuerst eingeführt hat, weil ein effizienzerhöhender Wettbewerb ausbleibt. Nach Einschätzung von Bernd Lange, Europäisches Parlament, sieht Trump die Welthandelsorganisation als störendes Element, das die USA in ihrer Handlungsfähigkeit einschränkt.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Braml & Gabriel Felbermayr & Wolfgang Weiß & Fritz Breuss & Christoph Scherrer & Christoph Herrmann & Caroline Glöckle & Benjamin Jung & Tim Krieger & Laura Renner & Bernd Lange, 2018. "Handelskrieg und seine Folgen: Ist die WTO am Ende?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(11), pages 03-29, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:71:y:2018:i:11:p:03-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fritz Breuss, 2018. "25 Years Single Market: Which Trade and Growth Effects?," WIFO Working Papers 572, WIFO.
    2. Benjamin Jung & Timo Walter, 2018. "Handels- und Wohlfahrtseffekte einer »Nulllösung«: Wegfall der EU- und US-Importzölle im Automobilsektor," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(15), pages 26-29, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internationale Handelspolitik; Außenwirtschaftspolitik; Weltwirtschaft; Handelshemmnisse; Protektionismus; Zollpolitik; USA; WTO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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