Un effet externe positif à l'embauche. L'amélioration de la connaissance de la qualité des travailleurs
In this paper, we develop a model in which hiring of unexperienced workers has a public good characteristic in revealing information on workers quality. We analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a microeconomics phenomenon : The job matching. In this framework, we show that a decentralized hiring process of unexperienced workers is suboptimal in regards to firms joint profits. A public hiring policy increases joint profits and, under some conditions, also increases employment. Such a public policy may be seen as a reduction of social charges on low wages. Classification JEL : H41, J23, J68
References listed on IDEAS
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