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Legal Compliance and Detection Avoidance: Results on the Impact of Different Law-Enforcement Designs

Author

Listed:
  • Bruttel Lisa

    (Department for Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany)

  • Friehe Tim

    (Public Economics Group, University of Marburg, Am Plan 1, 35032 Marburg, Germany)

  • Rehm Lennart

    (Department for Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany)

Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on how various law enforcement designs impact legal compliance and detection avoidance behaviors. Our three experiments explore differences in enforcement based on two factors: whether the fine revenue is allocated to the victim or the enforcer, and whether the enforcer has an active role in influencing enforcement. While the overall results indicate that these design variations have minimal impact on behavior on average, data from our most comprehensive study reveals contrasting effects on taking rates between men and women.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruttel Lisa & Friehe Tim & Rehm Lennart, 2025. "Legal Compliance and Detection Avoidance: Results on the Impact of Different Law-Enforcement Designs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 157-197.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:21:y:2025:i:2:p:157-197:n:1001
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0112
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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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