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You Are in Charge: Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Engel
  • Lilia Zhurakhovska

Abstract

Apparently, judges' decisions are not motivated by maximizing profit. Two explanations compete: there are long-term monetary consequences; conscientious individuals self-select into the profession. In a lab experiment, we rule out both explanations. Nonetheless, authorities do a reliable job of overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities public officials or judges strengthens the effect. This suggests that the effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims but follows from the office motive: the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with an assigned task. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach and more sensitive to their personal social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations. Experienced judges are more affected by their social value orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2017. "You Are in Charge: Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/691630
    DOI: 10.1086/691630
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Philipp Krügel & Nicola Maaser, 2020. "Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions," Economics Working Papers 2020-15, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    2. Konstantinos Kalliris & Theodore Alysandratos, 2023. "One judge to rule them all: Single‐member courts as an answer to delays in criminal trials," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(1), pages 233-268, March.
    3. Christoph Engel, 2022. "Judicial Decision-Making. A Survey of the Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2022_06, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    4. Christoph Engel & Keren Weinshall, 2020. "Manna from Heaven for Judges: Judges’ Reaction to a Quasi‐Random Reduction in Caseload," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 722-751, December.
    5. Christoph Engel, 2022. "Lucky you: Your case is heard by a seasoned panel—Panel effects in the German Constitutional Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(4), pages 1179-1221, December.
    6. Bruttel Lisa & Friehe Tim & Rehm Lennart, 2025. "Legal Compliance and Detection Avoidance: Results on the Impact of Different Law-Enforcement Designs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 157-197.
    7. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2019. "Political competition in judge and prosecutor elections," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 167-193, October.
    8. Christoph Engel, 2021. "Lucky You: Your Case is Heard by a Seasoned Panel – Panel Effects in the German Constitutional Court," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2021_05, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, revised 01 Jun 2022.
    9. Christoph Engel & Klaus Heine, 2017. "The dark side of price cap regulation: a laboratory experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 217-240, October.
    10. Florian Baumann & Sophie Bienenstock & Tim Friehe & Maiva Ropaul, 2023. "Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 229-255, September.
    11. Christoph Engel & Svenja Hippel, 2017. "Experimental Social Planners: Good Natured, but Overly Optimistic," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2017_23, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    12. Engel, Christoph & Zamir, Eyal, 2024. "Is transparency a blessing or a curse? An experimental horse race between accountability and extortionary corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    13. Christoph Engel, 2019. "When Does Transparency Backfire? Putting Jeremy Bentham's Theory of General Prevention to the Experimental Test," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 881-908, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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