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Are Regulators Rational?

Listed author(s):
  • Tasic Slavisa

    (University of Turin)

Registered author(s):

    Thus far, psychological input has been used in economics mainly to highlight the cognitive imperfections of market participants. The normative implication of behavioral economics in its current state is that imperfections of market participants should be rectified by psychologically informed regulators. However, regulators are themselves imperfect actors with limited cognitive capacities. I propose some biases and illusions documented by cognitive psychologists that may be relevant to the political economy of government regulation.

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    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jeeh.2011.17.issue-1/jeeh.2011.17.1.1248/jeeh.2011.17.1.1248.xml?format=INT
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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 17 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 1-21

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:17:y:2011:i:1:n:3
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    1. Smith, Adam, 1977. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226763743 edited by Cannan, Edwin, January.
    2. Hirshleifer, David, 2007. "Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation," MPRA Paper 5129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, 2008. "Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 67-84, Winter.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, 2001. "Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 915-957, October.
    5. Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger & David Schkade & Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, 2006. "Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion," Working Papers 77, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    6. Sunstein, Cass R, 2000. "Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 1059-1103, June.
    7. Cosmides, Leda & Tooby, John, 1994. "Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 327-332, May.
    8. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-319, June.
    9. Patt, Anthony & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2000. "Action Bias and Environmental Decisions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 45-72, July.
    10. repec:pri:cepsud:125krueger is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, 2000. "Behavioral Economics," NBER Working Papers 7948, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "Understanding Regulation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 439-451.
    13. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
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