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Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review

Listed author(s):
  • Büthe Tim

    (Duke University)

Registered author(s):

    This introduction to the special issue combines a review of the existing literature about the causes and consequences of private regulation in the global economy with a preview of the articles in this issue. To organize this (p)review, I introduce a conceptual model beyond supply and demand, which distinguishes three major subsets of stakeholders of global private regulation, which may (but need not) overlap: the political actors who call for private regulation, the rule-makers who provide such governance for the global economy, and what I call the targets of the private regulations, who are supposed to behave according to these private rules. I then highlight the three core questions addressed by the contributions to the special issue: (1) How do private bodies attain regulatory authority; why do private regulators provide governance; and why do the targets of the rules comply? (2) Who governs the global economy through private regulations? And (3) what are the effects of private regulation, and how does the rise of private regulation affect public regulatory authority and capacity?

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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (October)
    Pages: 1-40

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:12:y:2010:i:3:n:2
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