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Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC's Rise to Global Influence, 1973-2001


  • Martinez-Diaz Leonardo

    (Oxford University)


This article traces the ascent of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from an obscure group with little influence in the early 1970s to a pre-eminent position as global accounting standard-setter in 2001. I argue that the rise of the IASC can be explained by several factors, including the IASC's ability to build legitimacy through technical expertise, to embed itself in a network of international organizations, and to benefit from rivalries among developed and developing countries and among European and American regulators. But the most important reason for the IASC's success is that its core values aligned strongly with the interests of the most powerful regulator--the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

Suggested Citation

  • Martinez-Diaz Leonardo, 2005. "Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC's Rise to Global Influence, 1973-2001," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 1-28, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:7:y:2005:i:3:n:3

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:03:p:611-621_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
    5. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:33-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:303-315_20 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Büthe Tim, 2010. "Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 1-64, October.
    2. Botzem, Sebastian & Hofmann, Jeanette, 2008. "Transnational institution building as public-private interaction: the case of standard setting on the Internet and in corporate financial reporting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36535, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Palea, Vera, 2014. "Financial Reporting for Varieties of Capitalism: The Case Against a Single Set of International Financial Reporting Standards," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201442, University of Turin.
    4. Büthe Tim, 2010. "Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 1-40, October.
    5. Thiemann Matthias, 2014. "The impact of meta-standardization upon standards convergence: the case of the international accounting standard for off-balance-sheet financing," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 79-112, April.
    6. S. Susela Devi & R. Helen Samujh, 2015. "The Political Economy of Convergence: The Case of IFRS for SMEs," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 25(2), pages 124-138, June.

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