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Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act


  • Njoroge Kenneth

    (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA)


This paper develops a conceptual model that analyzes the impact of increasing market transparency under the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 on the incentives for collusion in the U.S. meatpacking industry. More than likely, meatpackers will have asymmetric priors regarding the distribution of livestock prices. Moreover, they lack the incentives to voluntarily reveal their real priors. Thus, the enforcer of the Act faces a problem of asymmetric information regarding the informativeness of publicly disclosed market reports relative to that of packers priors. Analytical results predict that divergent priors of Bayesian packers can be updated by more informative market reports, so that the resultant posteriors converge, enabling packers to identify a more efficient, unanimous trigger price. This enhances observability of deviations from collusive behavior, and increases the internal policing efficiency by a cartel that employs trigger price strategies to monitor deviations by its members. Contrary to the Acts well-intended objectives, this is consistent with promoting collusion and decreasing market efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Njoroge Kenneth, 2003. "Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bjafio:v:1:y:2003:i:1:n:14

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cheryl J. Wachenheim & Eric A. DeVuyst, 2001. "Strategic response to mandatory reporting legislation in the U.S. livestock and meat industries: Are collusive opportunities enhanced?," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 177-195.
    2. Albaek, Svend & Mollgaard, Peter & Overgaard, Per B, 1997. "Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 429-443, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Scott W. Fausti & Zhiguang Wang & Bashir A. Qasmi & Matthew A. Diersen, 2014. "Risk and marketing behavior: pricing fed cattle on a grid," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 45(5), pages 601-612, September.
    2. Rasch, Alexander & Herre, Jesko, 2013. "Customer-side transparency, elastic demand, and tacit collusion under differentiation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 51-59.
    3. Pozo, Veronica F. & Bejan, Vladimir & Tejeda, Hernan, 2016. "Disentangling Supply and Demand Shocks to Identify Changes in the Live Cattle’s Market Structure Post Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 236234, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Joseph, Kishore & Garcia, Philip & Peterson, Paul E., 2016. "Does the Boxed Beef Price Inform the Live Cattle Futures Price?," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 236166, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Kwon, Illoong & Jun, Daesung, 2015. "Information disclosure and peer effects in the use of antibiotics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
    6. Azzam, Azzeddine M. & Salvador, Santiago, 2004. "Information pooling and collusion: an empirical analysis," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 275-286, June.

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