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Search and Matching in Political Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Lisciandra Maurizio

    (Department of Law, Economics, and Communication, LUMSA, Palermo, Italy)

  • Miralles Asensio Antonio
  • Monteforte Fabio

    (Department of Economics, University of Messina, Messina, Italy)

Abstract

We develop a search and matching model to analyze the dynamics of the political corruption market. This model serves as a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a set of anti-corruption policies. Contrary to expectations, conventional policies such as enhancing penalties or allocating greater resources to criminal investigations do not universally emerge as the most effective tools. For mitigating small-scale political corruption, the optimal strategy is to curtail corruption signaling, achieved, for instance, through enhancing transparency and competitiveness in the exchanges between entrepreneurs and politicians. For large-scale corruption, raising the costs of corruption signaling proves less effective as a deterrent compared to ex-post policy measures, such as improved detection effectiveness and harsher sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisciandra Maurizio & Miralles Asensio Antonio & Monteforte Fabio, 2024. "Search and Matching in Political Corruption," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 69-96, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:24:y:2024:i:1:p:69-96:n:12
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2023-0022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political corruption; bribing; lobbying; deterrence; law enforcement; D72; D73; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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