Does the Market Punish Aggressive Experts? Evidence from Cesarean Sections
In many credence goods markets, a seller simultaneously diagnoses a problem and offers a recommendation to fix it. One might wonder what prevents these sellers from always exaggerating their customers needs. In this paper, we offer a simple explanation, namely, consumers may spurn sellers who have a reputation for such demand inducement. We test this explanation by examining patient choice of obstetrician in Florida. In most of the counties that we study, we find that maternity patients are significantly less likely to choose obstetricians who perform more than the expected number of cesarean sections. We address simultaneity by instrumenting for inducement propensity using information about the obstetrician's training. Although the instrument is weak, a series of robustness tests suggests that our findings are plausible while ruling out alternative explanations.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- John A. List, 2005.
"The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions,"
NBER Working Papers
11616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John A. List, 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-37, February.
- John List, 2006. "The behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and reputation effects in actual transactions," Natural Field Experiments 00300, The Field Experiments Website.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:11:y:2011:i:2:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.