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Four decades of multiyear targets in energy policy: aspirations or credible commitments?

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  • Gregory F. Nemet
  • Peter Braden
  • Ed Cubero
  • Bickey Rimal

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  • Gregory F. Nemet & Peter Braden & Ed Cubero & Bickey Rimal, 2014. "Four decades of multiyear targets in energy policy: aspirations or credible commitments?," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(5), pages 522-533, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:wireae:v:3:y:2014:i:5:p:522-533
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    12. Nemet, Gregory F., 2009. "Demand-pull, technology-push, and government-led incentives for non-incremental technical change," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 700-709, June.
    13. Jean-Daniel Saphores & Eric Gravel & Jean-Thomas Bernard, 2004. "Regulation and Investment under Uncertainty: An Application to Power Grid Interconnection," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 169-186, March.
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    3. Grafström, Jonas & Aasma, Siri, 2020. "Breaking Circular Economy Barriers," Ratio Working Papers 338, The Ratio Institute.
    4. Karoline S. Rogge & Elisabeth Dütschke, 2017. "Exploring Perceptions of the Credibility of Policy Mixes: The Case of German Manufacturers of Renewable Power Generation Technologies," SPRU Working Paper Series 2017-23, SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School.
    5. Rogge, Karoline S. & Schleich, Joachim, 2018. "Do policy mix characteristics matter for low-carbon innovation? A survey-based exploration of renewable power generation technologies in Germany," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(9), pages 1639-1654.

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