IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/scandj/v111y2009i4p629-653.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring

Author

Listed:
  • Alireza Naghavi
  • Gianmarco Ottaviano

Abstract

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Alireza Naghavi & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2009. "Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(4), pages 629-653, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:111:y:2009:i:4:p:629-653
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01587.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01587.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01587.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Wilhelm Kohler, 2004. "International outsourcing and factor prices with multistage production," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 166-185, March.
    3. Baldwin, Richard E. & Robert-Nicoud, Frederic, 2008. "Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 21-34, January.
    4. Nathan Nunn, 2007. "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 569-600.
    5. Baldwin, Richard & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2007. "Offshoring: General Equilibrium Effects on Wages, Production and Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 6218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 2004. "Managerial incentives and the international organization of production," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 237-262, July.
    7. Alexander Hijzen & Tomohiko Inui & Yasuyuki Todo, 2010. "Does Offshoring Pay? Firm‐Level Evidence From Japan," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(4), pages 880-895, October.
    8. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Macroeconomics 0308006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ottaviano, Gianmarco & Naghavi, Alireza, 2006. "Outsourcing, Contracts and Innovation Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
    11. Gene M. Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2008. "Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1978-1997, December.
    12. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003. "Government matters III : governance indicators for 1996-2002," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3106, The World Bank.
    13. Peter Gustafsson & Paul Segerstrom, 2010. "Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 207-228, May.
    14. Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 2010. "Offshoring in a Ricardian World," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 227-258, April.
    15. Pol Antràs, 2003. "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1375-1418.
    16. Pol Antras & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 552-580, June.
    17. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    18. Robert Feenstra & Gordon Hanson, 2001. "Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages," NBER Working Papers 8372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Alireza Naghavi & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2009. "Offshoring and product innovation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(3), pages 517-532, March.
    20. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    22. Choi, E. Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2003. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    23. Segerstrom, Paul S, 1998. "Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1290-1310, December.
    24. Jones, Charles I, 1995. "R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 759-784, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Colin Davis & Ken-ichi Hashimoto, 2019. "Innovation Offshoring with Fully Endogenous Growth," ISER Discussion Paper 1055, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Van Assche, Ari & Schwartz, Galina A., 2010. "Input specificity and global sourcing," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-85, March.
    3. Andreas Hoefele, 2013. "The Skill Content of Offshoring and Growth," Discussion Paper Series 2013_12, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Oct 2013.
    4. Colin Davis & Ken-ichi Hashimoto, 2016. "Innovation and Manufacturing Offshoring with Fully Endogenous Productivity Growth," Discussion Papers 1636, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    5. Colin Davis & Ken‐ichi Hashimoto, 2023. "Innovation offshoring and reshoring with fully endogenous growth," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 90(1), pages 90-120, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
    2. Altomonte, Carlo & Rungi, Armando, 2013. "Business Groups as Hierarchies of Firms: Determinants of Vertical Integration and Performance," Economy and Society 148920, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    3. Antrà s, Pol & Yeaple, Stephen R., 2014. "Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 55-130, Elsevier.
    4. Hatzigeorgiou, Andreas & Karpaty, Patrik & Kneller, Richard & Lodefalk, Magnus, 2016. "Immigrant Employment and the Contract Enforcement Costs of Offshoring," Working Papers 2016:7, Örebro University, School of Business, revised 01 Feb 2022.
    5. Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing," NBER Working Papers 12747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Liza Jabbour, 2012. "‘Slicing the Value Chain’ Internationally: Empirical Evidence on the Offshoring Strategy by French Firms," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(11), pages 1417-1447, November.
    7. Pol Antràs & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2009. "Organizations and Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 43-64, May.
    8. Macchiavello, Rocco, 2006. "Contractual Institutions, Financial Development and Vertical Integration: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5903, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Du, Julan & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Bi-sourcing in the global economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 215-222, April.
    10. Karpaty, Patrik & Tingvall, Patrik Gustavsson, 2011. "Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 243, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    11. Fabrice Defever & Farid Toubal, 2007. "Productivity and the Sourcing Modes of Multinational Firms: Evidence from French Firm-Level Data," CEP Discussion Papers dp0842, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    12. Schwarz, Christian & Suedekum, Jens, 2014. "Global sourcing of complex production processes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 123-139.
    13. Pol Antràs, 2014. "Grossman–Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 118-175.
    14. Newman, Andrew & Conconi, Paola & Alfaro, Laura & Fadinger, Harald, 2010. "Trade Policy and Firm Boundaries," CEPR Discussion Papers 7899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Rosario Crinò, 2009. "Offshoring, Multinationals And Labour Market: A Review Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 197-249, April.
    16. Ryuhei Wakasugi & Banri Ito & Eiichi Tomiura, 2008. "Offshoring and Trade in East Asia: A Statistical Analysis," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 7(3), pages 101-124, Fall.
    17. Ma, Yue & Qu, Baozhi & Zhang, Yifan, 2010. "Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 146-159, June.
    18. Gregory Corcos & Delphine M. Irac & Giordano Mion & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Determinants of Intrafirm Trade: Evidence from French Firms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 825-838, July.
    19. Kohler, Wilhelm & Smolka, Marcel, 2014. "Global sourcing and firm selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 411-415.
    20. Arnaud Costinot & Lindsay Oldenski & James Rauch, 2011. "Adaptation and the Boundary of Multinational Firms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 298-308, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:111:y:2009:i:4:p:629-653. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.