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Does Political Competition Matter for Economic Performance? Evidence from Sub‐national Data

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  • Saibal Ghosh

Abstract

The study utilises data on major Indian states for the period 1980–2004 to explore the impact of political competition on state‐level income and fiscal variables. The findings suggest that an increase in political competition leads to an increase in state per capita income and growth. In terms of magnitude, a proportionate increase in political competition, measured in terms of vote margin, raises per capita income by roughly 0.001. Focusing on fiscal variables, the analysis indicates that tighter political competition increases economic expenditure. The evidence also appears consistent with the career concern hypothesis, which suggests that politicians increase developmental spending in order to improve their re‐election prospects.

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  • Saibal Ghosh, 2010. "Does Political Competition Matter for Economic Performance? Evidence from Sub‐national Data," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(5), pages 1030-1048, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:58:y:2010:i:5:p:1030-1048
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00823.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Dash, Bharatee Bhushan & Mukherjee, Sacchidananda, 2013. "Does Political Competition Influence Human Development? Evidence from the Indian States," Working Papers 13/118, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    2. J. Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer & Bernard Grofman, 2016. "The Duverger-Demsetz Perspective on Electoral Competitiveness and Fragmentation: With Application to the Canadian Parliamentary System, 1867–2011," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 93-122, Springer.
    3. Bharatee Bhusana, Ferris, J Stephen Dash & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "Measuring Electoral Competitiveness: With Application to the Indian States," CESifo Working Paper Series 7216, CESifo.
    4. Deepti Kohli, 2022. "Elections, lobbying and economic policies: an empirical investigation across Indian states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 255-300, September.
    5. Saibal Ghosh, 2018. "An index of legislators’ performance: evidence from Indian parliamentary data," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 20(1), pages 129-151, April.
    6. Datta, Sandip, 2020. "Political competition and public healthcare expenditure: Evidence from Indian states," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
    7. Tobias Hiller, 2023. "Measuring the Difficulties in Forming a Coalition Government," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-15, March.
    8. Vivek JADHAV & Dr. Shrabani MUKHERJEE, 2024. "Nexus between political federalism, social diversity and human development in India," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(1(638), S), pages 187-200, Spring.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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