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Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält - Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden

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  • Stefan Voigt
  • Lorenz Blume

Abstract

Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals both with the determinants of corruption within the judiciary and with the consequences of institutional structures of the judiciary for corruption at large. It is shown that both the factual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies are correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions ("judicial accountability"). Copyright 2007 die Autoren Journal compilation 2007, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, 2007. "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält - Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 65-92, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:65-92
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    Cited by:

    1. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2015. "On the wrong side of the law – Causes and consequences of a corrupt judiciary," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 156-166.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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