Welfare-Enhancing Mergers Under Product Differentiation
In this paper we consider a model of duopoly with differentiated products to examine the welfare effects of a merger between two asymmetric firms. We find that, for quantity competition, the parameter range for welfare-enhancing merger widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand, mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when firms compete in prices. Copyright © 2010 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (07)
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