Profitability under Commitment in Cournot and Bertrand Mixed Markets
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
- Arghya Ghosh & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms," Discussion Papers 2008-18, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Kenji Fujiwara, 2007. "Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 51-65, September.
- Marcella Scrimitore, 2013. "Private And Social Gains In Delegation And Sequential Games With Heterogeneous Firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 81(4), pages 493-517, July.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:309-314 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lopez, Monica Correa & Naylor, Robin A., 2004. "The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 681-696, June.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-131, June.
- John Sutton, 1997. "One Smart Agent," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 605-628, Winter.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "Partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 309-314.
- Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2006. "Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 999-1015, December.
- White, Mark D., 2001. "Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 877-896, November.
- Corrado Benassi & Alessandra Chirco & Marcella Scrimitore, 2014. "Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 61-84, May.
- Ya-Chin Wang & Leonard Wang, 2009. "Delegation Commitment in Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 263-272, September.
- Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cho, Sumi & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2017. "Endogenous Private Leadership under Subsidy Policy on the Social Enterprises," MPRA Paper 83431, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Akira Ogawa, 2016. "Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(4), pages 2117-2127.
- repec:eee:reveco:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:363-370 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hirose, Kosuke & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2017. "Comparing Welfare and Profit in Quantity and Price Competition within Stackelberg Mixed Duopolies," MPRA Paper 77700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Xu, Lili & Cho, Sumi & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 73-82.
- Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2016. "Cournot–Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 117-136, March.
- Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2018. "Government-leading welfare-improving collusion," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 363-370.
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201412)170:4_684:pucica_2.0.tx_2-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.