Delegation Commitment in Oligopoly
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Volume (Year): 9 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
- Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-37, December.
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