IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-10-00083.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz

    () (Universidad del Pais Vasco)

Abstract

By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semipublic firm) and that all the firms are equally efficient, then in equilibrium both firms hire managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, 2010. "Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 744-750.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00083
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I1-P69.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    2. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz, 2009. "The Decision To Hire Managers In Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 376-388.
    3. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
    4. White, Mark D., 2001. "Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 877-896, November.
    5. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
    6. Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
    7. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara, 2015. "Délégation stratégique dans un duopole mixte international," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201518, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    2. Kadohognon S Ouattara, 2016. "How privatization affects the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the case of international mixed duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1038-1045.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed duopoly; Semipublic Firms; Managerial incentive contracts; Cournot competition;

    JEL classification:

    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00083. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.