Strategic managerial delegation and industrial policy competition in vertically-related markets
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More about this item
KeywordsVertically related markets; International mixed duopoly; Managerial delegation; Production subsidy;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
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