Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor
We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07.
- Yuanzhu Lu, 2006.
"Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 49-68, June.
- Yuanzhu Lu, 2005. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case," CEMA Working Papers 506, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Akira Nishimori & Hikaru Ogawa, 2005. "Long-Term And Short-Term Contract In A Mixed Market ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 275-289, 09.
- Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-743, August.
- Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:27:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- White, Mark D., 2001. "Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 877-896, November.
- Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S, 2002. "Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 267-281, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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