IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/124662.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor

Author

Listed:
  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Abstract

An existing study examines an international mixed duopoly involving a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm, focusing on their timing choices for quantities and showing that the state-owned public firm should act as the leader. This result differs from that for an endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model where a state-owned public firm coexists with a domestic private firm. We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly model where a state-owned public firm competes with a private firm that is partially foreign-owned. Specifically, we explore the desirable role of the state-owned public firm, either as a leader or a follower, and present the equilibrium outcome of the model. Our findings reveal that the equilibrium differs depending on whether the foreign ownership ratio of the private firm is low or high.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2025. "Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor," MPRA Paper 124662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:124662
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/124662/1/MPRA_paper_124662.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rabah Amir & Giuseppe Feo, 2014. "Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 629-658, August.
    2. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2009. "Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 90-99.
    3. Morley Gunderson, 1979. "Earnings Differentials between the Public and Private Sectors," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(2), pages 228-242, May.
    4. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    5. Delbono, Flavio & Scarpa, Carlo, 1995. "Upward-Sloping Reaction Functions under Quantity Competition in Mixed Oligopolies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 341-346, October.
    6. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
    7. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, July.
    8. Yuanzhu Lu, 2006. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 49-68, June.
    9. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-743, August.
    10. Lorenz NETT, 1993. "Mixed Oligopoly With Homogeneous Goods," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 367-393, July.
    11. Nett, Lorenz, 1994. "Why private firms are more innovative than public firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 639-653, December.
    12. Yuanzhu Lu, 2007. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(2), pages 1-7.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm," MPRA Paper 88223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2011. "A Quantity-Setting Mixed Duopoly with Inventory Investment as a Coordination Device," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 12(1), pages 109-119, May.
    3. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2014. "Sequential Mixed Competition with a Foreign Joint-stock Firm," International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies (IJSSMS), The Economics and Social Development Organization (TESDO), vol. 1(2), pages 38-52, June.
    4. Yoshihiro Tomaru & Masayuki Saito, 2010. "Mixed Duopoly, Privatization And Subsidization In An Endogenous Timing Framework," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(1), pages 41-59, January.
    5. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2019. "Capacity choice in an international mixed triopoly," MPRA Paper 94051, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Leonard F. S. Wang & Ya‐Chin Wang & Lihong Zhao, 2009. "Privatization And Efficiency Gain In An International Mixed Oligopoly With Asymmetric Costs," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 539-559, December.
    7. Kangsik Choi & Yuanzhu Lu, 2009. "A Model Of Endogenous Payoff Motives And Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 203-223, September.
    8. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Endogenous timing in a mixed triopoly with state-owned, labour-managed and capitalist firms," MPRA Paper 123007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2009. "Capacity Investment and Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 10(1), pages 49-64, May.
    10. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2020. "Endogenous public and private leadership with diverging social and private marginal costs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(5), pages 699-730, September.
    11. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2013. "A Two-production-period Model with State-owned and Labour-managed Firms," Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, vol. 5(1), pages 41-56, April.
    12. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2019. "Capacity choice in an international mixed triopoly," Working Papers e140, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    13. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two‐Production‐Period Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 403-413, October.
    14. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2010. "Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 121-127, June.
    15. Toshihiro Matsumura & Daisuke Shimizu, 2010. "Privatization Waves," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(6), pages 609-625, December.
    16. Toshihiro Matsumura & Akira Ogawa, 2010. "On The Robustness Of Private Leadership In Mixed Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 149-160, June.
    17. Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2010. "What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 101(3), pages 213-230, November.
    18. Heywood, John S. & Ye, Guangliang, 2009. "Mixed oligopoly and spatial price discrimination with foreign firms," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 592-601, September.
    19. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "A Three‐Stage International Mixed Duopoly With A Wage‐Rise Contract As A Strategic Commitment," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(4), pages 279-289, July.
    20. Yuanzhu Lu, 2006. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 49-68, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous timing; Mixed oligopoly; Partial foreign ownership; Stackelberg;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:124662. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.