A Three-Stage International Mixed Duopoly With A Wage-Rise Contract As A Strategic Commitment
This paper examines international mixed competition, where one domestic social-surplus-maximizing public firm and one foreign profit-maximizing private firm can adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper considers the following three stages. In the first stage, the domestic public firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the second stage, the foreign private firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose and sell their actual outputs. The equilibrium of the international mixed duopoly model is discussed. Copyright © 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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