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A Three-Stage International Mixed Duopoly With A Wage-Rise Contract As A Strategic Commitment




This paper examines international mixed competition, where one domestic social-surplus-maximizing public firm and one foreign profit-maximizing private firm can adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper considers the following three stages. In the first stage, the domestic public firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the second stage, the foreign private firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose and sell their actual outputs. The equilibrium of the international mixed duopoly model is discussed. Copyright © 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

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  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "A Three-Stage International Mixed Duopoly With A Wage-Rise Contract As A Strategic Commitment," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(4), pages 279-289, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:78:y:2010:i:4:p:279-289

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2007. "Wage-Rise Contract and Entry Deterrence: Bertrand and Cournot," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 8(1), pages 155-165, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2014. "Sequential Mixed Competition with a Foreign Joint-stock Firm," International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies (IJSSMS), The Economics and Social Development Organization (TESDO), vol. 1(2), pages 38-52, June.
    2. Rupayan Pal, 2010. "How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.

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