IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reecon/v64y2010i2p121-127.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Abstract

This paper examines an endogenous-timing mixed model, where a public firm competes against a foreign private firm. Each firm first chooses the timing for adopting a wage-rise contract as a strategic instrument. The following situation is considered. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses the stage in which it adopts a wage-rise contract, namely either stage 2 or stage 3. In the second stage, the firm choosing stage 2 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. In the third stage, the firm choosing stage 3 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its output. The paper discusses the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed model.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2010. "Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 121-127, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:64:y:2010:i:2:p:121-127
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090-9443(09)00059-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1989. "The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 283-301, April.
    3. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, July.
    4. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
    5. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & María Begoña Garzón, 2003. "Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 27-42, August.
    6. Toshihiro Matsumura & Osamu Kanda, 2005. "Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 27-48, February.
    7. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-743, August.
    8. Roger Ware, 1986. "A Model of Public Enterprise with Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(4), pages 642-655, November.
    9. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    10. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, January.
    11. Delbono, Flavio & Scarpa, Carlo, 1995. "Upward-Sloping Reaction Functions under Quantity Competition in Mixed Oligopolies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 341-346, October.
    12. Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S, 2002. "Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 267-281, September.
    13. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
    14. Amir Rabah, 1995. "Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 234-237, May.
    15. Lorenz NETT, 1993. "Mixed Oligopoly With Homogeneous Goods," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 367-393, July.
    16. Debashis Pal & Mark D. White, 1998. "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 264-281, October.
    17. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2003. "A Model of a Price-setting Duopoly with a Wage-rise Contract," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 149-157, June.
    18. Richard G. Harris & Elmer G. Wiens, 1980. "Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of Industry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 125-132, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:64:y:2010:i:2:p:121-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.