Welfare-Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry
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- Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2009. "Welfare?Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1081, The University of Melbourne.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller, 2015.
"Market Power, Efficiencies, and Entry Evidence from an Airline Merger,"
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- Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal and, 2009. "Aggregative Oligopoly Games with Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1175, The University of Melbourne, revised 2013.
- Han, Aiping & Ge, Jianping & Lei, Yalin, 2016. "Vertical vs. horizontal integration: Game analysis for the rare earth industrial integration in China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 149-159.
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More about this item
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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