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Competition And Mergers Among Nonprofits

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  • Jens Prüfer

Abstract

Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be assessed differently than mergers among for-profit firms? A recent debate in law and economics, boosted by apparently one-sided court decisions, has produced the result that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular objectives of producers. In this paper, I challenge the general validity of this result by showing that it may indeed depend on the particular objectives of producers whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare-decreasing or -increasing. This implies that it is impossible to assess the net effects of a merger between two nonprofits without examining the objectives of the owners involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Prüfer, 2011. "Competition And Mergers Among Nonprofits," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 69-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:69-92.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhq015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hidalgo-Hidalgo Marisa & Valera Guadalupe, 2016. "University Merging Process: A Guideline Proposal for Excellence-Enhancing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1359-1386, September.
    2. Cory Capps & Dennis W. Carlton & Guy David, 2017. "Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care?," NBER Working Papers 23131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Marco A. MARINI & Paolo POLIDORI & Desiree TEOBALDELLI & Alberto ZEVI, 2015. "Welfare Enhancing Coordination In Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(3), pages 505-527, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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