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Central Bankers as Migrating Birds: How Inflation Shapes the Rhetorical Strategies of Doves and Hawks

Author

Listed:
  • Jérôme Deyris
  • Bart Stellinga
  • Matthias Thiemann

Abstract

The Eurosystem is built on a compelling promise: shielded from national politics, ECB Governing Council members would be better positioned to deploy their science‐based expertise. Far from embodying this ideal, scholars have documented central bankers' opportunistic engagement with the ideas underpinning monetary policy. Whilst studies have often attributed this to reputation management strategies, we show how deeply entrenched national preferences – whether hawkish or dovish – shape how central bankers frame inflationary developments and prescribe policy solutions. Based on a quantitative and qualitative study of Eurozone central bank governors' speeches from 2014 to 2023, we reveal patterns of selective engagement with economic data, strategic scepticism regarding theories and indicators and weaponised uncertainty to support or cast doubt on monetary policy action. Crucially, these rhetorical strategies are leveraged conditionally on the inflation season, leading doves and hawks to act as migrating birds, embracing the other camp's position when economic circumstances change. Casting further doubt upon the proclaimed science‐based neutrality of central bankers, our study shows that central bank speeches should not be merely studied as reflections of policy learning or as instruments of reputation management but also as rhetorical tools to achieve national policy preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Deyris & Bart Stellinga & Matthias Thiemann, 2026. "Central Bankers as Migrating Birds: How Inflation Shapes the Rhetorical Strategies of Doves and Hawks," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 787-810, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:64:y:2026:i:2:p:787-810
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.70017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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