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Market structure and the coal cartel in early nineteenth‐century England1

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  • ELAINE S. TAN

Abstract

Using counterfactual competitive prices, the effect of the north‐east coal cartel on prices is estimated at 13–17 per cent between 1816 and 1845. Non‐cartel producers were highly responsive to price changes, and their threat to the cartel was made credible by market integration facilitated by canals. The spread of railways had little impact on the cartel's market power. Highly inelastic demand and responsive supply from other regions meant that deadweight losses from the cartel were insignificant throughout this period.

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  • Elaine S. Tan, 2009. "Market structure and the coal cartel in early nineteenth‐century England1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(2), pages 350-365, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:62:y:2009:i:2:p:350-365
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2008.00441.x
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    Cited by:

    1. John E. Murray & Javier Silvestre, 2020. "Integration in European coal markets, 1833–1913," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 73(3), pages 668-702, August.
    2. Peter M. Solar & Oliver Buxton Dunn & Aidan Kane, 2024. "Shipping in the London coal trade, 1700‒1860," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 77(3), pages 1005-1034, August.
    3. Andrea Günster & Stephen Martin, 2015. "A Holy Alliance: Collusion in the Renaissance Europe Alum Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, August.
    4. Indrajit Ray, 2015. "Dynamics of Bengal coal mining in the nineteenth century: Dissemination of mineralogical knowledge and railway networking," The Indian Economic & Social History Review, , vol. 52(4), pages 463-499, October.

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