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Les paiements directs aux agriculteurs dans l'Union européenne : politique communautaire ou politiques nationales?

Author

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  • Bontems, Philippe
  • Bureau, Jean-Christophe

Abstract

[eng] Direct payments to the agricultural sector in the European Union : national or european policies? . Some EU common policies could be more efficient if they were managed in a decentralised way by national agents (member states or regions) who are more able to fine-tune these policies to local conditions. This might, however, lead to a renationalisation of the CAP, generating competition distortions between countries. Delegation of EU policies to national agents is seen as a trade-off between information (efficiency of local management) and the risk of "conclusion" (i.e. a converging interests between States and producers for benefiting from EU funding). Recent contributions of economic theory of contracts and information are illustrated with the case of EU agri-environmental payments. [fre] Certaines politiques communautaires peuvent être plus efficaces si leur gestion est déléguée à des agents mieux armés pour les ajuster aux conditions locales, comme les États ou les régions. Cependant, la "renationalisation" de la PAC que ceci implique comporte des risques de distorsions de concurrence au sein de l'UE. La délégation des politiques communautaires à des structures nationales est ici abordée comme un arbitrage entre un problème d'information (efficacité d'une gestion locale) et un risque de "collusion" (convergence d'intérêts entre un État et ses producteurs bénéficiant de fonds communautaires). Les apports récents de l'économie de l'information et de contrats sont illustrés avec l'exemple des paiements agri-environnementaux.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bontems, Philippe & Bureau, Jean-Christophe, 1996. "Les paiements directs aux agriculteurs dans l'Union européenne : politique communautaire ou politiques nationales?," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 233.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:354269
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.354269
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Chatellier & Karine Daniel & Francois Colson, 2002. "Direct payments to European farm further to the CAP reforms (1992 and Agenda 2000) [Les aides directes aux exploitations agricoles européennes suite aux réformes de la PAC (1992 et Agenda 2000)]," Post-Print hal-02681248, HAL.
    2. Chateluer, Vincent & Kleinhanss, Werner, 2002. "Agenda 2000 et modulation des aides directes de la pac en Allemagne et en France," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 268.
    3. Tomas Garcia Azcarate, 1996. "La politique agricole commune : contribution à un débat," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 236(1), pages 71-72.
    4. Garcia Azcarate, Tomas, 1996. "La politique agricole commune : contribution à un débat," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 236.
    5. Revel, Alain, 2000. "L'Europe centrale, centre de l'Europe?," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 255.

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