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Congestion Models With Consistent Conjectures

  • Holloway, Garth J.

This paper demonstrates that, in situations in which a cumulative externality exists, the basic nature and extent of resource misallocation may be substantially less than we imagine. This conclusion stems from deriving consistent conjectures in a unified framework in which congestion is present. Experiments support the conclusion that, when numbers of agents are small, when there is little heterogeneity among them, and when they have the opportunity to observe each other during repeated experiment, the market allocation may be efficient.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22372
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Article provided by Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its journal Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (1996)
Issue (Month): 03 (December)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:ags:ajaeau:22372
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  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521297615 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. T. Gordon MacAulay, 1995. "Games, Clubs And Models: The Economics Of An Agricultural Economics Society," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 39(1), pages 1-23, 04.
  3. Martin K. Perry, 1982. "Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 197-205, Spring.
  4. MacAulay, T. Gordon, 1995. "Games, Clubs And Models: The Economics Of An Agricultural Economics Society," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 39(01), April.
  5. Bresnahan, Timothy F, 1981. "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 934-45, December.
  6. Sugden, Robert, 1985. "Consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods: why the conventional theory does not work," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 117-124, June.
  7. MacAulay, T. G., 1995. "Games, Clubs and Models: The Economics of Agricultural Economics," 1995 Conference (39th), February 14-16, 1995, Perth, Australia 148779, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  8. Appelbaum, Elie, 1982. "The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 287-299, August.
  9. Haveman, Robert H, 1973. "Common Property, Congestion, and Environmental Pollution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 278-87, May.
  10. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
  11. Shaw, Daigee & Shaw, Rong-Dean, 1991. "The resistibility and shiftability of depletable externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 224-233, May.
  12. Brown, Gardner, Jr, 1974. "An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 163-73, Jan.-Feb..
  13. Scafuri, Allen J., 1988. "On consistency of conjectures in the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 395-398, December.
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