Reservation Prices And Pre-Auction Estimates: A Study In Abstract Art
Using a sample of European abstract art we show that reservation prices constrain pre-auction estimates in such a way that we are more likely to observe overestimation relative to the midpoint of the estimation window. At the same time, we also find that the low pre-auction estimate is a more powerful, accurate and precise predictor of hammer prices than the high estimate.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 24 (June)
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