Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies
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- Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, 2007. "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," FEMM Working Papers 07004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
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Cited by:
- Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2011.
"The fixed wage puzzle: Why profit sharing is so hard to implement,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 104-106, February.
- Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 441, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
- Jürgen Jerger & Jochen Michaelis, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle : Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," Working Papers 283, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
- Jürgen Jerger & Jochen Michaelis, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201013, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Bornstein, Gary & Kugler, Tamar & Budescu, David V. & Selten, Reinhard, 2008.
"Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 808-821, June.
- Gary Bornstein & David V. Budescu & Tamar Kugler & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Repeated Price Competition Between Individuals and Between Teams," Discussion Paper Series dp303, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Max Albert & Andreas Hildenbrand, 2016. "Industrial Organization and Experimental Economics: How to Learn from Laboratory Experiments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 135-156, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
Principal-agent theory; piece rate; fixed wage; collective wage agreements; Nash bargaining solution;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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