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Incitations Managériales et Concurrence : Synthèse de la Littérature

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  • Ahmed Ennasri

Abstract

Ce papier survole la littérature théorique et empirique de l’effet de la concurrence sur les schémas de rémunération et sur l’effort du dirigeant. Les études théoriques montrent que la concurrence affecte les incitations et l’effort du dirigeant par son effet sur la structure informationnelle quant à l’effort du dirigeant (effet informationnel), par son effet sur la fonction d’utilité du dirigeant (effet revenu-direct) et par le biais de l’impact de la concurrence sur la performance de l’entreprise. Sur le plan empirique, très peu de travaux ont été consacrés à l’effet de la concurrence. Ces travaux s’intéressent généralement à l’effet de la concurrence sur la rémunération incitative, sur la productivité des employés au sein des entreprises ou sur les coûts d’agence.

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File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/ES2010-03.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Studies and Syntheses with number 10-03.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision: Oct 2010
Handle: RePEc:lam:estudy:10-03

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