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Competition, long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms

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  • Horn, Henrik
  • Lang, Harald
  • Lundgren, Stefan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 213-233

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:2:p:213-233

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Cited by:
  1. Henry Ergas & Mark Wright, 1994. "Internationalisation, Firm Conduct and Productivity," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: Philip Lowe & Jacqueline Dwyer (ed.), International Intergration of the Australian Economy Reserve Bank of Australia.
  2. Ahmed Ennasri & Marc Willinger, 2011. "Managerial incentives under competitive pressure: Experimental investigation," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 11-12, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2011.
  3. Stennek, Johan, 2000. "Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1727-1744, October.
  4. Kraft, Kornelius & Niederprum, Antonia, 1999. "Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 17-27, September.
  5. Haskel, Jonathan & Sanchis, Amparo, 2000. "A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 539-556, May.
  6. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2004. "Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-75, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Ahmed Ennasri, 2010. "Incitations Managériales et Concurrence : Synthèse de la Littérature," Studies and Syntheses, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 10-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2010.
  8. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Moses Acquaah, 2003. "Corporate Management, Industry Competition and the Sustainability of Firm Abnormal Profitability," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 57-85, March.
  10. Stennek, J., 1995. "Competition Reduces X-Inefficiency - A Note on a Limited Liability Mechanism," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 599, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  11. Varian, Hal R., 1995. "Entry and cost reduction," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 399-410, November.
  12. Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1995. "Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 117-138, January.
  13. Bijl, P.W.J. de, 1995. "Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1995-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Koeke, J. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002. "Does Good Corporate Governance Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth?," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Agency Cost of Debt and Lending Market Competition: Is there a Relationship?," CESifo Working Paper Series 274, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno M., 1998. "Do managers work harder in competitive industries?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 489-498, March.

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