Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective

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Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective

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Haucap, Justus
Pauly, Uwe
Wey, Christian

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 287-307
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:287-307

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Paper
- Justus Haucap & Uwe Pauly & Christian Wey, 2000. "Collective Wage Setting When Wages Are Generally Binding: An Antitrust Perspective," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-01, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 2002. "Unionization Structures and Firms' Incentives for Productivity Enhancing Investments," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-10, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Haucap, Justus & Christian Wey, 2003. "Unionisation Structures and Firms' Incentives for Productivity Enhancing Investments," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 102, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
Haucap, Justus & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Unionization Structures and Innovation Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 4079, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 2004. "Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 398, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 2004. "Unionisation structures and innovation incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages C149-C165, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul Heidhues, 2000. "Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
Arijit Mukherjee, 2007. "Irrelevance of productivity difference: A case with labor union," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 10(17), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, 2007. "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," FEMM Working Papers 07004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, . "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1129, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]

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