Negotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industry
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 35 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
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- Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999.
"Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly,"
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Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 19-40, February.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1388, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Contensou, François, 2004. "Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04011, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Kornelius Kraft, 2006. "Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 595-604.
- Göddeke, Anna & Haucap, Justus & Herr, Annika & Wey, Christian, 2011. "Stabilität und Wandel von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen aus wettbewerbsökonomischer Sicht," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 10, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Dhillon, Amrita & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2001. "Profit-sharing, bertrand competition and monopoly unions : a note," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 612, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, 2007.
"Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies,"
FEMM Working Papers
07004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Kirstein, Roland & Kirstein, Annette, 2004. "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Guigou, Jean-Daniel, 2002. "Contrats de dette participative en environnement stratégique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 5-17, Mars.
- Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Profit-Sharing: Does It Reduce Bargaining Inefficiencies ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997009, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Chau, Minh & Contensou, François, 2004. "Profit-Sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04012, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
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