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Educating Europe

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  • Panu Poutvaara

    (Centre for Economic and Business Research)

Abstract

The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. Such effects may be especially severe for the prospective new member states of the European Union. The European Union could overcome this by allowing countries to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how such a system could look like for Finland, as well as discusses its implementation. Such contracts could be voluntary, education financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/0302/0302008.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0302008.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0302008

Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on Xerox3N1; pages: 37 ; figures: none. Available also as CEBR DP 2003-01
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: graduate taxes; European Union; individual accounts; income- contingent loans; migration;

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