Why Invest in Your Neighbor? Social Contract on Educational Investment
AbstractIt may be in the interestof low-ability individuals to subsidize the education of high-abilityindividuals. The sufficient conditions are surprisingly mild:positive externalities in education and complementarity in productionbetween human capital and labor supplied by the low-ability individuals.However, tax competition and the free mobility of the educatedgive rise to time-inconsistency and free-riding problems whichrender such a social contract infeasible and result in a suboptimallylow investment in education. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 7 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
externalities in education; complementarity; social contract; tax competition;
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