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On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education

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Author Info
Panu Poutvaara (CEBR)

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Abstract

I analyze simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education using a model with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. I derive the results both for a once-and-for-all voting system with commitment and for repeated voting. My model allows demographic change and productivity growth. Even when cohorts are of the same size, the median voter may be a young uneducated citizen.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0303001.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 03 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0303001

Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC; to print on Xerox3N1; pages: 36 ; figures: included. This is a revised version of CESifo Working Paper No. 424 (February 2001) and CEBR Discussion Paper 2002-02.
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Related research
Keywords: Social security Public education Voting Implicit intergenerational contract Structure-induced equilibrium

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2001. "Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?," Occidental Economics Working Papers 1, Occidental College, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Marko Köthenbürger & Panu Poutvaara & Paola Profeta, 2005. "Why are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alison Booth & Facundo Sepulveda, 2007. "Endogenous Fertility Policy And Unfunded Pensions," CAMA Working Papers 2007-06, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mehmet S. Tosun, 2005. "Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International Labor Mobility: A Political Economy Perspective," IMF Working Papers 05/140, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-28.

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