Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy
AbstractThis paper studies the relationship between public education and pay-as-you-go social security in a representative democracy, where the government reacts both to voting and lobbying activities of workers and pensioners. While an intergenerational conflict prevails concerning actual social security contributions, workers may prefer public education for its positive effect on later pension benefits. Population aging diminishes the relative lobbying power of pensioners, leading to a higher contribution rate, educational expansion, and higher per capita income growth.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 05 April 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
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