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Political Equilibria with Social Security

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Author Info
Michele Boldrin (University of Minnesota and CEPR)
Aldo Rustichini (Boston University)

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Abstract

We model PAYG social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a OLG model with production. When voting, individuals make two choices: pay the elderly their pensions or default. which amount to promise themselves next period. Under general circumstances, there exist equilibria where pensions are voted into existence and maintained. Our analysis uncovers two reason for this. The traditional one relies on intergenerational trade and occurs at inefficient equilibria. A second reason relies on the monopoly power of the median voter. It occurs when a reduction in current savings induces a large enough increase in future return on capital to compensate for the negative effect of the tax. We characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare properties. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1999.0072
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 41-78
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:41-78

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Related research
Keywords: overlapping generations; political economy; social security systems; taxation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Robert C. Merton, 1981. "On the Role of Social Security as a Means for Efficient Risk-Bearing in an Economy Where Human Capital Is Not Tradeable," NBER Working Papers 0743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Diamond, P. A., 1977. "A framework for social security analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 275-298, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 3272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, . "The Family and the State," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 87-15, Chicago - Population Research Center.
    Other versions:
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Browning, Edgar K, 1973. "Social Insurance and Intergenerational Transfers," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 215-37, October.
  7. Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Vincenzo Galasso, 1999. "The US Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(3), pages 698-730, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Boadway, Robin W & Wildasin, David E, 1989. "A Median Voter Model of Social Security," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(2), pages 307-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Samuelson, Paul A, 1975. "Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(3), pages 539-44, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Esteban Joan Maria & Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Intertemporal Transfer Institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 189-205, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-28.

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