Risk Taking and Taxation : An Alternative Perspective
AbstractThe analysis of risk taking and taxation has almost invariably been in a portfolio choice framework. This paper presents the alternative perspective of an occupational choice framework - where risk taking involves the additional element of discrete choice between safe and risky activities. It is shown that the specification of equilibrium must of necessity have a general equilibrium character. In this setting the paper develops rules for government intervention in the market equilibrium, and analyses the effects of taxation on risk taking.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 136.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1978
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kanbur, S. M., 1981. "Risk taking and taxation : An alternative perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 163-184, April.
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