This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Why are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marko Köthenbürger ()
Panu Poutvaara ()
Paola Profeta ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. Our key insight is that linking benefits to past earnings (less redistributiveness) reduces the efficiency cost of social security (due to endogenous labor supply). This encourages voters who benefit from social security to support higher contribution rates in political equilibrium. We test our theory with a numerical analysis of eight European countries. Our simple, but suggestive median voter model performs relatively well in explaining the stylized fact and cross-country differences in social security contribution rates.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1397.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1397.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1397

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: earnings-related and flat-rate benefits social security public pensions median voter model

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Disney Richard, 2004. "Are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 267-311, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Franco Peracchi, 2002. "The European Community Household Panel: A review," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 63-90. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Reforming our pension system: Is it a demographic, financial or political problem?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 974-983, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Krueger, Alan B. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2002. "Labor supply effects of social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 33, pages 2327-2392 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2002. "The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement," IDEI Working Papers 144, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2003. "Pensions and the path to gerontocracy in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 153-158, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Working Papers 2007-07, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2004. "Lessons For An Aging Society: The Political Sustainability Of Social Security Systems," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 2004-07, Center for Retirement Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Herwig Immervoll & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2005. "Welfare Reform in European Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 1810, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Boadway, Robin W & Wildasin, David E, 1989. "A Median Voter Model of Social Security," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(2), pages 307-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Poutvaara, Panu, 2004. "On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education," IZA Discussion Papers 1408, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Svend E. Hougaard Jensen & Morten I. Lau & Panu Poutvaara, 2004. "Efficiency and Equity Aspects of Alternative Social Security Rules," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(3), pages 325-, September.
  17. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Sveinbjörn Blöndal & Stefano Scarpetta, 1999. "The Retirement Decision in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 202, OECD Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  19. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Robert Fenge & Martin Werding, 2003. "Ageing and the Tax Implied in Public Pension Schemes: Simulations for Selected OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Casey Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Internationally Common Features of Public Old-Age Pensions, and Their Implications for Models of the Public Sector," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1067-1067. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Galasso, Vincenzo, 2000. "The US Social Security: A Financial Appraisal For The Median Voter," CEPR Discussion Papers 2456, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. " A Positive Theory of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(3), pages 523-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Working Papers 2007-07, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Tim Krieger & Stefan Traub, 2008. "Back to Bismarck? Shifting Preferences for Intragenerational Redistribution in OECD Pension Systems," Working Papers 13, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2008. "Aging, Inequality and Social Security," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-19, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  4. Michael Gorski & Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2007. "Pensions, Education and Life Expectancy," Working Papers 4, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.