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What Social Security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

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Author Info
J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz
Paola Profeta

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Abstract

Bismarckian social security systems are associated with larger public pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than Beveridgean systems. This paper introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for all these features. Agents differ in age, income and in their ability to invest in the capital market. The voting game determines the degree of redistribution of the social security system -Bismarckian or Beveridgean- and the size of the transfer (for the low-income retirees). In an economy with three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to minimize their tax contribution and to invest their resources in a private scheme. Middle- income individuals favor a large earning-related (Bismarckian) system. Hence, large (small) inequality is associated with a small Beveridgean (large Bismarckian) system and a large (small) private system.

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Paper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number 2003-16.

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Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2003-16

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 1998. "Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 397-420, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Franco Peracchi, 2002. "The European Community Household Panel: A review," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 63-90. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  5. David M. Cutler & Richard Johnson, 2001. "The birth and growth of the social-insurance state : explaining old-age and medical insurance across countries," Research Working Paper RWP 01-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Tito Boeri & Axel Boersch-Supan & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Pension Reforms and the Opinions of European Citizens," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 396-401, May. [Downloadable!]
  7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, January.
  8. Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2000. "Early Retirement," CEPR Discussion Papers 2589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 1999. "Positive Arithmetic of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2202, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Michael J. Boskin & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Douglas J. Puffert & John B. Shoven, 1987. "Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations," NBER Working Papers 1891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pierre Pestieau, 1999. "The Political Economy of Redistributive Social Security," IMF Working Papers 99/180, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Casey B. Mulligan, 2001. "Economic Limits on "Rational" Democratic Redistribution," Working Papers 0107, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  15. Galasso, Vincenzo, 2000. "The US Social Security: A Financial Appraisal For The Median Voter," CEPR Discussion Papers 2456, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Diamond, P. A. & Hausman, J. A., 1984. "Individual retirement and savings behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 81-114. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. " A Positive Theory of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(3), pages 523-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandro, SOMMACAL, 2004. "Pension systems and intragenerational redistribution when labor supply is endogenous," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2004008, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rainald Borck, 2003. "On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 369, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dariusz Stanko, 2004. "Social Security in Theory and Practice: An Essay," Public Economics 0401007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Juan Prieto & Juan Gabriel Rodríguez & Rafael Salas, . "Polarization, Inequality and Tax Reforms," Working Papers 2003-23, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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