What Social Security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?
Bismarckian social security systems are associated with larger public pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than Beveridgean systems. This paper introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for all these features. Agents differ in age, income and their ability to invest in capital market. The voting game determines the degree of redistribution of the social security system - Bismarckian or Beveridgean- and the size of the transfer. In an economy with three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to minimize their tax contribution and invest their resources in a private scheme. Middle-income individuals instead favor a large earning-related system. Hence, large (small) inequality is associated with a small Beveridgean (large Bismarckian) system and a large (small) private system
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Franco Peracchi, 2002. "The European Community Household Panel: A review," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 63-90.
- Conde-Ruiz, J.I. & Galasso, V., 2000.
"Positive Arithmetic of the Welfare State,"
Economics Working Papers
eco2000/23, European University Institute.
- CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1999.
"The political economy of social security,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 259, CESifo Group Munich.
- Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2000.
CEPR Discussion Papers
2589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, .
"Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1328, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 1998. "Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 397-420, June.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed004:317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.