Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rainald Borck

Abstract

The paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majority voting. Voters differ by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases with income. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and benefits, and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal tax rates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates are supported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalition for high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. `Ends against the middle' equilibria are also possible.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.40777.de/dp369.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 369.

as in new window
Length: 17 p.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp369

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin
Phone: xx49-30-89789-0
Fax: xx49-30-89789-200
Email:
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Voting; public pensions; life expectancy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. BOADWAY, Robin W. & WILDASIN, David E., . "A median voter model of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -839, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Phillip Swagel, 2001. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," NBER Working Papers 8405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
  5. Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 394, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Julia Lynn Coronado & Don Fullerton & Thomas Glass, 2000. "The Progressivity of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7520, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  8. J. Ignacio Conde & Paola Profeta, 2002. "What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 633, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Orazio P. Attanasio & Carl Emmerson, 2001. "Differential Mortality in the UK," NBER Working Papers 8241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1998. "On the political sustainability of redistributive social insurance systems," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1998038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Angus S. Deaton & Christina Paxson, 2001. "Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality among American Cohorts," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Themes in the Economics of Aging, pages 129-170 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Reil-Held, Anette, 2000. "Einkommen und Sterblichkeit in Deutschland: Leben Reiche länger?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 00-14, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  13. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  14. Carlos Bethencourt & Vincenzo Galasso, . "On the Political Complementarity between Health Care and Social Security," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 184, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  15. Lindert, Peter H., 1996. "What Limits Social Spending?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-34, January.
  16. Guillem López & Joan Gil, 1997. "Life-time redistribution effects of the Spanish public pension system," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 242, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp369. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.