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On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education

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  • Panu Poutvaara

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Abstract

This paper proposes and analyzes a model of a “European economy” with three overlapping generations, redistributive social security, and public universities without tuition. Individuals differ ex ante. The effect of wage tax rate on occupational choice and the voting equilibrium of wage tax rate and educational investments are analyzed both under full certainty and with income risks facing the educated and the uneducated.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2001/wp-cesifo-2001-02/cesifo_wp424.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 424.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_424

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Keywords: Education; social security; redistributive taxation; occupational choice;

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