Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Konrad, Kai A.

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Abstract

Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the contextof time consistent labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp82.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 82.

as in new window
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 79(3), 503-519
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp82

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Privacy; time consistent income taxation; commitment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," NBER Working Papers 1154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. " A Theory of the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
  3. Robin W. Boadway & Michael Keen, 1993. "Evasion and Time Consistency in the Taxation of Capital Income," Working Papers 890, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  5. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
  6. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
  7. Richard Arnott & Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Information and Economic Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 4533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Dillen, M. & Lundholm, M., 1992. "Dynamic Income Taxation, Redistribution, and the Ratchet Effect," Papers 1992-3, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  9. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  10. Boadway, R. & Marchand, M., . "The use of public expenditures for redistributive purposes," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1131, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April.
  12. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  13. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September.
  14. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
  15. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 171-89, May.
  16. Jacob Mincer, 1994. "Investment in U.S. Education and Training," NBER Working Papers 4844, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  18. Robin W. Boadway & Maurice Marchand, 1990. "The Use of Public Expenditure for Distributive Purpose," Working Papers 796, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  19. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series 538, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities," Working Papers 080908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Olsen, Trond E. & Straume, Odd Rune, 2005. "Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?," Discussion Papers 2005/8, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  4. Fertig, Michael & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2000. "Discretionary Measures of Active Labor Market Policy: The German Employment Promotion Reform in Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 182, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Poutvaara, Panu, 2004. "On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education," IZA Discussion Papers 1408, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, . "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  7. Poutvaara, Panu, 1999. "Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.