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Evasion and time consistency in the taxation of capital income

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  • Robin Boadway
  • Michael Keen

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its series IFS Working Papers with number W93/20.

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Date of creation: Oct 1993
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Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:93/20

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Cited by:
  1. Selim, Sheikh, 2007. "On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-31, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2001. "Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-firm Trade and Ownership Structure," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 219, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  3. Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
  4. Manfred Gärtner & Frode Brevik, 2006. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-19, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  5. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, . "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.
  8. Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2009. "Education, redistribution and the threat of brain drain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-24, February.
  9. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December.
  10. Pääkkönen, Jenni, 2008. "Optimal Law Enforcement and Welfare in the Presence of Organized Crime," BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/2008, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  11. Pirttilä, Jukka, 1999. "Tax Evasion and Economies in Transition: Lessons from Tax Theory," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/1999, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

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