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Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?

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Author Info
Frode Brevik
Manfred Gärtner ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-008-9284-z
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 136 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 103-122
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:103-122

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Related research
Keywords: Leviathan government; Income tax; Tax evasion; Public spending; Rent seeking;

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  1. Philippe Bacchetta & María Espinosa, 2000. "Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 275-293, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2000. "Is Tax Policy Coordination Necessary?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2348, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre & Sato, Motohiro, 2003. "Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 451-458, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 117-132, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 39-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2004. "The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-competition Paradox," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 83-106, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1998. "Evasion and Time Consistency in the Taxation of Capital Income," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 461-76, May.
    Other versions:
  12. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Edward C. Prescott, 1988. "Time consistency and policy," Staff Report 115, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  13. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Dr. Peter Kenning & Hilke Plassmann, 2004. "NeuroEconomics," Experimental 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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