This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Conconi, Paola (Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), University of Warwick (CSGR) and CEPR)
Perroni, Carlo (University of Warwick and CESifo)
Riezman, Raymond (University of Iowa and CESifo)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions. On one hand, governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates. On the other hand, they are unable to commit to future policies and, once capital has been installed, have incentives to increase taxes. In this setting, there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions. We compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios: no tax harmonization (all countries set taxes unilaterally), global tax harmonization (all countries coordinate their capital taxes), and partial tax harmonization (only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes). We show that, if capital is sufficiently mobile, partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp_795.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 795.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:795

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CV4 7AL COVENTRY
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Margaret Nash).

Related research
Keywords: Tax Competition Commitment Partial Coordination

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2000. "The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 429-472, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Konrad, Kai A. & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 1999. "Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 156-167, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2006. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5762, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Slemrod, Joel & Hansen, Carl & Procter, Roger, 1997. "The seesaw principle in international tax policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 163-176, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Paul Krugman, 1991. "The move toward free trade zones," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-58.
  10. Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 642, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Rogers, Carol Ann, 1987. "Expenditure taxes, income taxes, and time-inconsistency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-230, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Edward C. Prescott, 1988. "Time consistency and policy," Staff Report 115, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997. "Optimal Taxes without Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 231-259, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.